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Despite the popular protests that took place in 2011, the political economy of Tunisia remains 
largely characterized by processes of state capture and cronyism. While benefiting the ruling 
class, the social and economic costs of these mechanisms are detrimental to most of the 
population. There is a tendency in policy and academic circles to characterize state capture 
as the result of a late-development syndrome and unfair competition. This policy paper, 
however, proposes to adopt an alternative outlook. It argues for the need to critically reflect 
on the key role of the current neoliberal economic model in sustaining these dynamics. Based 
on the pursuit of the profit rate, the push for neoliberal reforms in Tunisia have sustained 
predation and rentierism since the late 1980s. In such a context, the European Union (EU) 
should rethink its terms of economic engagement based on neoliberal premises, and instead 
sustain an economic agenda aiming to regulate the rights and responsibilities of local and 
international capital in the interest of all.
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Ten years have passed since the so-called ‘Arab Spring,’ but there were no festive celebrations marking 
these revolts in Tunisia. Since 16 January 2021, nationwide protests have erupted against the govern-
ment and, more importantly, in reaction to the economic crisis plaguing the country during the current 
global pandemic. Unfortunately, the wave of discontent that led to the fall of long-standing govern-
ments in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) has not produced the desired results—mean-
ing better socio-economic conditions and political freedom. In this policy paper, I argue, in fact, that the 
political economy of Tunisia remains characterized by processes of state capture and cronyism, whose 
social and economic costs have detrimental consequences towards most of the population. There is 
a tendency in policy and academic circles to characterize state capture as the result of a late-develop-
ment syndrome and unfair market-competition. This policy paper, however, proposes to adopt an alter-
native outlook. It argues for the need to rethink the key role of the current neoliberal economic model 
in sustaining these dynamics. Based on the pursuit of profit, the push for neoliberal reforms in Tunisia 
since the 1980s has sustained predation and rentierism. In such a context, the EU should rethink its 
terms of economic engagement based on free-trade agreements, and instead sustain an economic 
agenda aiming to regulate the rights and responsibilities of local and international capital in the interest 
of nature and for the majority of society.
The importance of this research to EU-LISTCO lies in how it reveals the role and the interlinkages 
between local, national, regional, and external actors in fostering (or undermining) resilience in areas 
of limited statehood or contested orders (ALS/CO). As a result, this policy paper mainly recommends 
for the EU to:
– Put an end to free trade agreements.
– Develop a more egalitarian economic agenda with countries of the Southern Neighborhood.
The paper is divided in three main sections. In the first one, it examines how mainstream analyses 
present the problem of state capture in Tunisia. The second part explains how state capture has 
emerged in Tunisia under neoliberal conditions of development. The last section provides two main 
policy suggestions to overcome this impasse.
STATE CAPTURE? BEYOND THE LATE-
DEVELOPMENT SYNDROME
When mainstream analyses focus on the nature of the progressive informalization and pauper-
ization of the Tunisian economy, they often stress and link it to the issue of state capture (Diwan 
et al. 2019). Their main argument lies in demonstrating how political authorities pursue policies 
that allow them to receive favours with great economic value. To capture the state, private and 
public actors collude and rely on the systematic abuse of formal institutions in order to accu-
*A longer and more articulated version of this policy paper is forthcoming, see Capasso (2021) ‘From 
























mulate power and wealth. Like many other states in the MENA region, Tunisia’s political econ-
omy is described as based on deals between political and economic elites rather than on the 
enforcement of clear and impartial rules. Some analysts have argued that politics have driven 
economic development in the MENA region, and this has not allowed their population to benefit 
fully from the process of economic globalization, distorting the inherent degree of dynamism of a 
market-oriented society (Clement and Springborg 2010). In the aftermath of the 2011 revolts, the 
World Bank conducted a study that laid out this argument in an emblematic fashion, arguing that 
state capture in Tunisia under Ben Ali had been driven by an abuse of regulatory measures used 
to protect his clan. In other words, the state intervened ‘too much’ in the economy. Interestingly, 
these interpretations agree that state capture is the result of weak institutions or a late-develop-
ment syndrome, and the political economies of these states appear as detached or not fully part 
of the global neoliberal economy. 
However, as this policy paper argues, the liberalization of these countries’ economies lies at the core 
of these dynamics of rentierism. When poorer, less secure countries with weak production capacity 
open up their markets, the interests of the ruling class become integrated—and thus, dollarized—in 
the safer international financial markets (Kadri 2015). As a result, the national resources, capital and 
labour flee the national market. Why? Because it is not nationalist enthusiasm or charitable procliv-
ities that allocate resources, but it is the pursuit of profit. In other words, neoliberalism has served 
as a belt for the interests of the ruling elites and their international allies, albeit to the detriment of 
the lower segments of the population. In doing so, the ruling elites further renounced their traditional 
constituencies of farmers, workers, and low-level civil servants, seeking instead the political support 
of the international business elite. 
As we shall see, those interlinkages cannot be underestimated in the case of Tunisia, and we should 
keep them in mind when thinking about sources of risks and threats, and the societal resilience of 
the Southern Neighbourhood.
THE NEOLIBERAL EXPERIENCE IN 
TUNISIA
The liberalization of the Tunisian economy, which begun with President Ben Ali in the late 1980s, had 
highly disruptive consequences for the country, since the introduction of market forces allowed the 
ruling elites to consolidate the process of state capture (Brésillon 2020). Both the EU and internation-
al financial institutions (IFIs) did not refrain from supporting the adoption and promotion of legisla-
tive and economic measures that, while pushing for privatization, led to a massive deterioration of 
the conditions of workers. 
This process, in fact, led to a significant shift in the economy by the end of the 1990s, whereby the 
inner circles around Ben Ali started to control investments and private projects. Ben Ali’s clan man-
aged to establish a vast and lucrative business empire through a process of increasing privatization 
accompanied by tax evasion. As a study from the World Bank notices, the enterprises confiscated in 
the aftermath of 2011, linked to the Ben Ali family, represented approximately a fifth of all private sec-
tor profit: They were ‘on average significantly larger than their competitors and record spectacularly 
higher levels of output, profits and growth’ (Rijkers and Freund and Nucifora 2014, 24). Liberalization 
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of the economy has turned out to be a source of profit and wealth for the ruling elites, but it has 
also acted as a source of potential risks (i.e., loss of work or acceptance of increasingly precarious 
working conditions) and thus reduced resilience of farmers, peasants and working classes, more 
generally. In fact, the formal sector remained under the control of rent-seeking elites who reaped 
the benefits of opening the economy to international capital, which significantly affected the distri-
bution of wealth and power within and among the local population (Hibou 2011). Those differences 
emerged clearly in the imbalance of economic and social reforms and developmental policies that 
the state implemented predominantly in the coastal areas and the capital, Tunis, leading to the mar-
ginalization of the other regions (Santini 2018). Such disparities not only hindered local resilience but 
also led to several rounds of contestation and governance breakdown, as they exploded in late 2010. 
As a poll conducted after the revolution shows, most of the respondents believed that the revolution 
had been induced by the youth (96%), the unemployed (85.3%), and the disadvantaged (87.3%) (SIG-
MA Group 2011). 
Moreover, the political lexicon concerning the objectives of agricultural policy changed dramati-
cally from the end of the 1980s. The integration of Tunisia’s agriculture into the global market has 
created a structural food dependence and a general impoverishment of the peasantry, unable to 
supply their own food security (see Ayeb and Bush 2019). This shift was based on the reorienta-
tion of agricultural, economic and ‘natural’ resources to the benefit of investment in agribusiness, 
promoting the interests of those who benefitted from state investment in irrigation to the detri-
ment of family farming (El Safi 2016). Far from being a simple political slogan, those policies pro-
duced large-scale changes. Tunisian agricultural strategy no longer focused on producing more 
for those in need but became instead a strategy to produce more to export (Ayeb and Bush 2019: 
93–122). As a result, these neoliberal reforms triggered the pauperization of the economy—such 
as a rise in precarious working activities, particularly in the long-neglected regions of the South, 
including the increasing participation in human and oil smuggling (Capasso 2021; Meddeb 2017). 
As a result, the progressive deterioration of socio-economic conditions not only encouraged so-
cietal discontent before 2011 (Yousfi 2017) but played a significant role in fanning the flames of 
the popular protests that resulted in the overthrow of Ben Ali (Hibou and Khiari 2011).
After 2011, Tunisia continued to be praised as a successful revolutionary story. Yet, the economic 
elites have further entrenched their position by hijacking the transition process, while unemployment, 
particularly youth unemployment, is on the rise (Schaefer 2018), and currently standing at 35-6% 
(World Bank 2019). The transitional government seized the assets of the Ben Ali affiliated-clan, re-
sulting in several prosperous state-linked companies being sold in a call for tender opened to lo-
cal investors. While on the surface this suggested a restructuring of the economy, its structural 
conditions have not shifted significantly.  After 2011, neoliberal reforms and Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs) have continued to be pushed by various coalitions governments. The Ennhanda-led 
budget in 2013, for instance, was formulated on a logic of austerity, including a regressive tax policy, 
cuts on social spending, and a limited increase in wages (Erol 2019). At the same time, rent-seeking 
elites continue profiting vis-à-vis the global economy. In this regard, tax evasion provides an import-
ant example. By way of illustration, in 2018 employees paid 5,488.4 million dinars in taxes; double 
the amount paid by the companies that employ them (i.e., 2,713.8 million dinars) (Abderrazek 2020). 
Furthermore, oil companies only contributed 4% of total tax revenue, despite generating very large 
profits (ibid.). The Panama Papers further show how big industrial tycoons continue operating off-
shore accounts, and the documents include the names of Tunisian businessmen whose operations 























WHAT CAN THE EU DO?
This policy paper argues that state capture in Tunisia should not be understood as the result of a 
late-development syndrome and unfair market-competition, as mainstream analyses often highlight. 
Rather this process has consolidated under three decades of neoliberal policies undertaken by the 
Tunisian ruling class in cooperation with EU member states and IFIs. To promote a more egalitarian 
model of development and reduce socio-economic inequalities in Tunisia, the policy paper proposes 
two main policy recommendations for the EU:
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 1: PUT AN END TO FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS. 
The EU’s approach to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Tunisia is 
dictated by its own commercial interests. Such agreements reduce the societal resilience of the local 
society exposed to the pressures of global markets and competition, while allowing ruling elites to 
enrich themselves further. In other words, it reifies historical and structural economic legacies rooted 
in deep power imbalances. While inserting the most profitable Tunisian companies into the European 
free market, it will condition how the Tunisian market is to supply the EU. It will force—for instance—a 
shift toward production of fruit and vegetables for export, creating a dependence on imports for the 
basic cereals that make up most Tunisian diets. In doing so, such agreements will exploit Tunisian 
cheap local labour force for the extraction of profits (Riahi and Hamouchene 2020). By opening the 
local economy to global competition without any form of protectionism (i.e., import quotas, tariffs 
on imported goods, etc.) for local production, the EU-Tunisia trade liberalization agenda represents 
a concrete risk to the socio-economic conditions of Tunisian workers, peasants and small farmers. 
Therefore, free trade agreements should come to an end.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 2: FOCUS ON THE ELABORATION OF AN ECONOMIC AGEN-
DA IN THE INTERESTS OF NATURE AND TUNISIAN LABOUR.
Such an initiative should begin to focus, for instance, on policy reforms that tackle economic and 
mobility issues (Alternative Trade Mandate 2014). On the one hand, it could advance discussions 
promoting the creation of reciprocal conditions of mobility between the two shores of the Mediter-
ranean. On the other, it requires to identify the necessary conditions to improve the lives of Tunisian 
labourers, particularly those working on informal markets, small farmers, peasants and young grad-
uates. This could take place through the launch of technological and scientific exchange on equal 
bases between Tunisia and the EU, which would allow improving the quality of Tunisian productions. 
Moreover, a bigger focus should be posed on the ways in which EU trade policy can enhance the right 
of countries and regions to develop their local and regional trade, rather than global one (for example, 
in the agricultural sector).
After all, state capture is not a unique feature of Tunisia, rather this process is a defining feature of more 
advanced neoliberal economies, such as the United States and United Kingdom. Recent studies have 
documented how neoliberal policies create rentier mechanisms, where politicians use rental income to 
indulge in clientelist practices that help them to stay in office (Standing 2016) via processes of financial 
rentierism (Piketty 2020; Mazzuccato 2018). This is a global problem and the EU—now, more than ever—
is called to provide leadership and emphasize the need for a more egalitarian international political-eco-
nomic model that alleviates the aggressive progression of neoliberalism, whose impact on the Southern 
Neighbourhood has become a concrete source of threats for the EU.
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